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Résumé / Abstract
Comment l'information asymétrique (sur les coûts de production) en
concurrence spatiale modifie-t-elle le comportement d'une firme établie capable de
s'engager de manière crédible à une localisation donnée? Bien que la dissuasion
d'entrer ne soit pas pertinente dans ce contexte, nous montrons que la firme établie
peut parfois bloquer l'entrée grâce ou bien à son avantage technologique ou bien aux
croyances de l'entrant quant à cet avantage. Nous caractérisons pour différents
niveaux de coûts fixes et variables l'unique équilibre K-imbattu. Nous montrons que
les croyances de l'entrant sont importantes pour la détermination des stratégies
d'équilibre. Ainsi, le centre du marché peut être une localisation bloquante en
information incomplète pour une firme établie non-avantagée qui, en information
complète, choisirait une localisation accomodante. Par ailleurs, nous montrons
qu'une firme établie avantagée capable en information complète de bloquer l'entrée
en se localisant au centre du marché pourrait choisir en information incomplète une
localisation accomodante.
How does asymmetric information (regarding production costs) in a
spatial market alter the behavior of the incumbent firm which can credibly
commit to her location choice? Although entry deterrence is irrelevant here, our
analysis shows that entry blockading behavior emerges not only as the result of
the incumbent's technological advantage but also as the result of the entrant's
beliefs concerning this technological advantage. Using the concept of K-
undefeated equilibrium, we characterize the unique location equilibrium for
different values of the fixed and variable costs and we show that the conjecture
formed by the entrant regarding the incumbent's location strategy does matter
for the determination of the equilibrium strategies. First, we show that the market
center may be an entry blockading location under incomplete information for a
high cost inefficient incumbent who would accommodate entry under complete
information. Second, we show that a low cost efficient incumbent who blockades
entry at the market center under complete information may be better off to
accommodate entry under incomplete information.
Mots clés : Localisation, entrée, information incomplète
Keywords : Location, Entry, Incomplete Information
1 INTRODUCTION
Bain (1956) has suggested that an incumbent facing potential entry can follow one of three kinds
of strategies. The incumbent blockades entry if, in choosing the same strategies that would be
chosen were there no threat of entry, entry is prevented. When entry cannot be blockaded, the
incumbent deters entry if she can alter her strategies chosen under no threat of entry such that
she successfully impedes entry. Finally, the incumbent accommodates entry if she nds it more
protable to let a competitor enter the market than to erect costly barriers to entry.
Following Bain's classication of entry possibilities, economic theorists rst focused on price
or quantity as a barrier to entry. Dixit (1979) has shown that a classication of cases along
the lines of Bain is possible either under the `Sylos-Labini postulate', where a level of output is
chosen and maintained forever whether or not entry occurs, or under the possibility suggested
by Wenders (1971) and Spence (1977), that entry can be prevented by the incumbent using a
credible threat to produce a large enough post-entry output. However, the conclusion that an
incumbent may at equilibrium deter entry was based in some cases upon the strong assumption
that she could commit to a price chosen at pre-entry, which is another way to formulate the
Sylos-Labini postulate. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) have shown that were this assumption
relaxed, there would be no limit pricing in any complete information model, hence entry could
not be deterred as dened by Bain. They modeled the problem of entry deterrence as a game of
incomplete information in order that limit pricing behavior emerges endogenously in equilibrium:
when a potential entrant does not know the incumbent's cost level, the latter may discourage
entry by charging a pre-entry price below her monopoly price in order to signal that she is a low
cost incumbent, hence a potentially more aggressive competitor if entry occurs.
Bain's classication remains valid in the context of dierentiated products. Consider the
following competitive structure: rst, the incumbent selects the quality or location of her prod-
uct; second, a potential entrant observes this choice and decides to enter if he can guarantee
himself positive prots (net of xed cost); third, if entry occurs the rms compete in prices and
if not, the incumbent monopolizes the market. This sequence of moves leads to a game-theoretic
equilibrium formulation which is a proper and relevant way to analyze entry deterrence.
y
In such a spatial setup, the incumbent is assumed to commit to a chosen location. Unlike
price commitment, it is natural to think that an established rm can credibly commit to a
location because it may reasonably be assumed that relocation is costly and therefore that
location is irreversible. Despite such a commitment, it is not obvious that entry deterrence
should nd formal justication under complete information in a model where the incumbent's
y
See for example Bonanno (1987), Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), Donnenfeld and Weber (1995).
Note however that the expression \deterring entry" is often used also in the sense of \blockading entry".
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choice is restricted to a single location in a spatial market with a uniform or symmetric unimodal
distribution of consumers. Indeed, the market center is not only the optimal location for a
monopolist in absence of an entry threat but also the location that minimizes the maximum
attainable gross prot of the potential entrant: there is no way to deter entry by moving to a
location away from the center. Entry is either blockaded for values of the xed cost that are
larger than the entrant's gross prot or accommodated, but it cannot be deterred as dened by
Bain. This conclusion holds under the assumption that consumers are uniformly distributed
over the market line segment. However, it may not hold if the density of consumers is skewed
towards one side of the market. Then the central location is no longer the optimal location for
an incumbent in absence of an entry threat since transportation costs are more important on
the side of the market where consumers are more numerous. But the market center is still the
location that triggers the highest degree of expected competition that an entrant faces whatever
his location. Hence the market center may be an entry deterrent strategy as dened by Bain.
In our analysis we maintain the assumption of an uniform density of consumers in order to
focus on two of the three strategies considered by Bain: the entry blockading strategy versus the
entry accommodating strategy. Our main concern is to study how asymmetric information alters
the behavior of an established rm in a spatial market. Contrary to the limit pricing results of
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), there is no entry deterring strategy under incomplete information
in the present case - recall that our model is dierent in that the incumbent can credibly commit
to her pre-entry location choice. Moreover, our analysis shows that entry blockading behavior
emerges not only as the result of the incumbent's technological advantage, that is, of the high
xed cost of entry and the production cost gap under complete information as presented in the
standard literature, but also as the result of the entrant's beliefs concerning this technological
advantage. Expectations may be self-fullling in a context of incomplete information. Thus an
incumbent may rationally accommodate entry because she is not considered to be suciently
strong to blockade entry even if she would indeed be that strong when properly identied.
The potential entrant is assumed to be imperfectly informed about some characteristic of the
established rm which is relevant to his post-entry prot. In our model this characteristic is the
incumbent's production cost which we assume to be her private information. We assume that
the incumbent is at least as ecient as the entrant, that is, her unit production cost is lower
than or the same as the entrant's and the latter does not know whether he faces a more ecient
competitor or a similarly ecient one. We concentrate on spatial dierentiation and assume
that rms choose their locations sequentially before they simultaneously compete in delivered
prices. If the entrant decides to enter, the true cost of the incumbent is revealed before the
price competition stage as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In order to avoid trivialities, we
focus on the case in which, under complete information, the more ecient incumbent would
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blockade entry at the market center whereas the less ecient incumbent would accommodate
entry, thus the xed cost of the potential entrant is neither too small nor too large. The inability
of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept to determine a potential entrant's posterior beliefs
if an out-of-equilibrium location is observed results in a multiplicity of equilibrium location
congurations. However, it is possible to dene what reasonable beliefs should be in such cases.
We will make use here of a notion closely related to the notion of \undefeated equilibrium",
a particularly interesting renement proposed by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1993). Our \K-undefeated equilibrium" concept will turn out to be powerful enough in the
present context to single out a reasonable equilibrium.
z
We focus on pure strategy equilibria,
hence on the sole separating and pooling equilibria. The case of mixed strategy equilibria when
xed costs are negligible have been analyzed in Boyer, Laont, Mahenc and Moreaux (1994,
1995). Allowing for mixed strategies would give no additional insights to the entry preventing
role of the xed costs.
Our main results are as follows. We single out a K-undefeated equilibrium for dierent
values of the xed and variable costs and we show that the conjecture formed by the entrant
regarding the incumbent's location strategy does matter for the determination of the equilib-
rium strategies. We will consider the entrant to be optimistic (pessimistic) if he puts a priori
less (more) probability on the more ecient incumbent. In terms of equilibrium or predicted
locations, we rst show that the market center may be an entry blockading location under in-
complete information for a high cost inecient incumbent who would accommodate entry under
complete information. Second, we show that a low cost ecient incumbent who blockades entry
at the market center under complete information may be better o to accommodate entry under
incomplete information.
The intuition behind these results is that the pre-entry location becomes a signal regarding
the incumbent's unit cost. If the entrant is suciently pessimistic, the market center emerges as
an entry blockading equilibrium for the high cost incumbent because information is not disclosed
in equilibrium: she nds it protable to mimic her low cost counterpart and therefore the market
center is the only plausible equilibrium location. In equilibrium the potential entrant remains
uncertain about his competitor's cost and stays out whereas he would enter and compete against
a high cost incumbent under full information. The low cost incumbent remains at the market
center, her full information equilibrium location from which she blockades entry. However, if the
entrant is suciently optimistic, that is, if he expects instead the incumbent to be a high cost one
with the same unit cost as his, the entrant enters the market whatever the incumbent's location
z
The better known renements such as Kreps' intuitive criterion, Cho and Kreps' D1 divinity criterion or
Grossman and Perry's sequential perfectness criterion fail to generate a unique reasonable equilibrium in the
present case; the undefeated criterion of Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) is almost powerful
enough but not quite.
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and true cost. Since the incumbent fails to prevent entry even if she is in fact more ecient
than the entrant, locating at the market center exacerbates the level of post-entry competition.
Thus, when the entrant is suciently optimistic, not only is the market center no longer an
entry-blockading location but it also cannot be an equilibrium location for the incumbent of
either the high cost or low cost type. The low cost incumbent then nds it protable to locate
away from the market center and accommodate entry. Two cases may be distinguished according
to technological characteristics: the xed and variable costs. Either separation of the types is
possible and the low-cost incumbent discloses her true cost by locating in an area where the
high-cost incumbent wouldn't locate, or separation of the types is not possible and a pooling
equilibrium emerges. In both cases the low-cost incumbent prefers to move away from the
market center to benet from a higher degree of product dierentiation, hence a lower degree of
post-entry competition.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the basic model and the full information bench-
mark in section 2. We devote section 3 to the concepts and tools used to study the incomplete
information case. The characterization of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria is achieved in section
4 and the K-undefeated equilibria among the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are characterized in
section 5. We then conclude by summarizing the most striking results of the paper.
2 THE MODEL AND THE COMPLETE INFORMATION
BENCHMARK
We consider a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on a segment [0; 1] with unit
density. Each consumer demands one unit of the good, provided that its price is not higher
than the reservation value r. An established rm and a potential entrant are involved in a two
stage game. In the rst stage the incumbent chooses her location and the entrant makes two
simultaneous decisions: to enter the market or not, and upon entry, to locate a single plant. The
rms move sequentially and the incumbent, denoted as rm 1, is the rst mover. Entry implies
a xed cost and locations are irreversible. In the second stage of the game the rms compete
in delivered prices as in Hurter and Lederer (1985) and Lederer and Hurter (1986). In the rst
stage of the game, rm 2 observes only the location decision of rm 1 before deciding on its
own entry and location. As usual in this kind of model since the seminal work of Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), we suppose that rm 2 will know rms 1's type before the price competition
takes place in stage 2. Finally, the two rms are risk neutral, hence maximize their expected
prot.
If it enters, rm 2 incurs a constant average variable cost c and a xed cost f . The incumbent
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incurs only a variable cost and is assumed to be either strong or weak. We will refer to rm
1 with constant average variable cost 0 and c as the low and high cost types respectively. Let
T = ft j t 2 fh; `gg be the set of types, with h (`) being the high (low) cost type, and let 
0
t
be
the prior probability of the type t of rm 1. In order to keep the model as simple as possible
we assume that the transportation cost incurred by the rms are the same and equal to the
distance times the delivered quantities. We suppose that r > 1+c so that any rm could supply
any consumer and make a prot over variable costs (production + transportation) if it were in a
monopoly position. We assume also that c <
1
2
which implies that the second mover can always
nd a location so as to enjoy a positive share of the market and a positive prot gross of the
xed cost of entry, provided that rm 1 does not sell at prices lower than its total variable cost.
The above model is relatively standard in location theory except for the fact that it is
the rst location model to consider the entry preventing role of xed costs under incomplete
information. The specic modeling strategy used here is justied as follows. First, the second
stage competition is assumed to be a Bertrand-like competition in delivered price schedules
because in this way we can avoid the problem of the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies,
which would appear with competition in mill pricing (see d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979)). We can therefore concentrate on the analysis of the role of xed costs in an incomplete
information structure. Second, the particular incomplete information structure considered here,
namely an informed incumbent at least as ecient as the uninformed entrant, corresponds to
many observed situations such as those in which an incumbent rm may have acquired or not
a cost advantage, through learning or experience, over an entrant. Finally, because of the
information structure and the sequencing of moves, the location chosen by an established rm
becomes a signal regarding that rms's costs. This signal may be used by the second mover to
infer the type of the rst mover, that is, whether or not rm 1 has acquired a cost advantage,
which is a determining factor of the post-entry price schedule and of the entrant's prot. The
other elements of the model are basically simplifying assumptions or standard features of location
models.
Let us examine what happens in the case of complete information which will serve as a
benchmark. We denote by x
i
2 [0; 1][fNEg  I , rm i's decision at the rst stage of the game,
where x
i
2 [0; 1] means that rm i has chosen to enter the market and locate at a distance x
i
from 0; x
i
= NE means that rm i has chosen not to enter. Let p
i
(x; x
1
; x
2
; t) be the price
quoted by rm i to a consumer located at x when the rst stage location decisions are x
1
and
x
2
and the type of rm 1 is t. Since a rm which is out of the market cannot obviously compete
in the second stage, we assume that p
2
(x; x
1
; NE; t) > r for all x 2 [0; 1]. Following Lederer
and Hurter (1986), we assume that a consumer who is quoted the same price by both rms buys
from the rm realizing the larger prot on his demand; if both rms realize the same prot on
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that sale, he then buys from either one with some probability whose exact value has no eect
on the equilibrium values. Following Hoover (1937) and the formal investigation by Lederer
and Hurter (1986), it can be shown that under these assumptions the following price schedule
constitutes the Nash equilibrium of the second stage subgame starting from (x
1
; x
2
):
p
i
(x; x
1
; x
2
; t)
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
= max fj x  x
1
j +c; j x   x
2
j +cg if t = h and (x
1
; x
2
) 2 [0; 1]
2
= max fj x  x
1
j; j x  x
2
j +cg if t = ` and (x
1
; x
2
) 2 [0; 1]
2
= r if x
i
2 [0; 1] and x
j
= NE
> r if x
i
= NE
(2. 1)
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to the cases where x
1
2
h
0;
1
2
i
since rm
2 will observe x
1
before deciding on x
2
. Hence given spatial dierentiation, the price equilibrium
is such that the price quoted to a consumer located at x is the second-lowest serving cost over
all rms. A formal discussion with the explicit subgame equilibrium prot functions is given in
the Appendix. By backward induction we can now characterize the equilibrium location choices.
Under full information a location may be entry blockading for an incumbent only if the
potential entrant incurs a suciently high xed cost f . We assume that f 2
h
f(c); f

. The
lower value f(c) is the upper bound of the xed cost allowing the entrant to enter the market
whatever the location and type of rm 1. If f  f(c) then whatever her location and whatever
her type, an incumbent cannot deter entry and both types accommodate entry in full information
equilibrium: facing the low cost incumbent, the entrant locates further away from the market
center so that products are more dierentiated than when rm 1 is a high cost incumbent. The
analysis is then similar to the case with no xed cost studied in Boyer, Laont, Mahenc and
Moreaux (1994, 1995). The higher value f is the lower bound of the xed cost values allowing
the high cost incumbent to blockade entry by simply locating at the market center. This is
then the optimal location of both types. In addition, this location also minimizes the maximum
attainable gross prot of a potential entrant. Hence for values higher than f , entry is blockaded.
When f 2
h
f(c); f

, the weaker incumbent can no longer blockade entry under full information.
Realizing this, she locates away from the market center, at x
1
= 2=5 in equilibrium, and rm 2
enters and locates at x
2
= 4=5, that is, also away from the market center in order to soften price
competition. The low cost incumbent can still blockade entry by locating at the market center.
Hence, for f in this interval, entry is accommodated by the high cost incumbent whereas it is
blockaded by the low cost incumbent when information is complete.
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3 THE CASE OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: PRE-
LIMINARY RESULTS
We expect the incumbent to modify her behavior when the potential entrant does not know
exactly her unit costs. In such a situation of asymmetric information the incumbent's location
may become a signal regarding her costs. As mentioned above, we concentrate on values of f
belonging to the more interesting interval

f(c); f
i
for which, under complete information, entry
is blockaded by a low cost incumbent but accommodated by a high cost one. Since the type of
rm 1 is revealed by assumption before the beginning of stage 2, the equilibrium price schedule
is determined according to (2.1) in any subgame perfect equilibrium in which rm 2 is active.
Hence we can concentrate on the rst stage of the game.
3.1 Strategies and equilibria
A pure strategy of rm 1 is a mapping x^
1
: T ! I
1
, where I
1

h
0;
1
2
i
. We will denote by
x^
1
(t) the location selected by x^
1
for type t. A pure strategy of rm 2 is a mapping x^
2
: I
1
!
I
2

h
1
2
; 1
i
[ fNEg. We also need a family of conditional distributions giving, for each location
decision of rm 1, the posterior probabilities on the types of rm 1 upon which rm 2 will base
its own location decision. Let ^ : I
1
! M be the posterior mapping, where M is the set of
probability distributions dened on T . We will denote by ^
t
(x
1
) the probability assigned by
rm 2 to type t given the observed location x
1
.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a triplet E

 fx^

1
; x^

2
; ^

g such that:
(i) for t = h; ` : x^

1
(t) 2
x
1
2I
1

1
(x
1
; x^

2
(x
1
) ; t)
(ii) for any x
1
2 I
1
: x^

2
(x
1
) 2
x
2
2I
2
P
t=h;`
^

t
(x
1
) 
2
(x
1
; x
2
; t)
(iii) for any x
1
2 Rx^

1
(where Rz is the range of the function z): if Bayes's rule can be applied,
^

t
(x
1
) is obtained from the prior 
0
and rm 1's strategy via Bayes' rule; otherwise,
^

t
(x
1
) is indeterminate.
Condition (i) requires that rm 1 of type t maximizes its prot given the strategy of rm
2. Condition (ii) requires that rm 2 maximizes its expected prot for any decision x
1
taken by
rm 1, given the posterior belief ^

t
(x
1
) based on the observation of rm 1's location. Condition
(iii) requires that rm 2's posterior beliefs be consistent with the priors and rm 1's strategy if
Bayes' rule can be applied, that is, if x
1
2 fx^

1
(t) j t 2 Tg. The posteriors are indeterminate for
out-of-equilibrium locations. We will denote by E the set of PBE. To simplify notation, we will
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denote by  the posterior probability with which rm 2 is believing that rm 1 is of the low cost
type.
Let ~x
2
(x
1
; ) be rm 2's best response after observing rm 1's decision x
1
with the posterior
probability  taken here as a parameter. Formally:
~x
2
(x
1
; ) 2
x
2
2I
2
f
2
(x
1
; x
2
; `) + (1  ) 
2
(x
1
; x
2
; h)g (3. 1)
Let _x
1
(; f) denote the incumbent's location for which the potential entrant, given his posterior
belief, is indierent between entering and staying out. Straightforward calculations give:
_x
1
(; f) = min
(
1  c 

3
4


2
c
2
  c
2
+ 4f


1=2
;
1
2
)
Note that if rm 2 assumes that rm 1 is a high cost rm, then _x
1
(0; f) =
1
2
since 1  (3f)
1=2
is strictly larger than
1
2
for values of f smaller than f . Thus there is no location at which
the incumbent thwarts entry when the potential entrant believes her to incur the same variable
cost as his own. By contrast, if rm 2 believes that the incumbent is a low cost rm, then
_x
1
(1; f) = 1   c   (3f)
1=2
which is smaller than
1
2
for values of f larger than f(c). Thus
any location close to the market center, belonging to the interval

_x
1
(1; f) ;
1
2
i
(respectively

_x
1
(; f) ;
1
2
i
), thwarts entry when rm 2 believes with probability 1 (respectively ) that rm
1 incurs the same variable costs.
Let
^

1
(x
1
; ; t)  
1
(x
1
; ~x
2
(x
1
; ) ; t) be the prot of rm 1 of type t located at x
1
, given
that rm 2 chooses optimally its own location, believing with probability  that rm 1 is of the
low cost type.
x
The upper part of Figure 1 shows the prot function
^

1
of the low cost incumbent
as a function of x
1
for dierent values of . The lower part shows the prot function
^

1
of the
high cost incumbent. The functions are bivalued at _x
1
(; f) provided that the xed cost f is
suciently high, namely f > f(c). Figure 1 illustrates how crucial rm 2's conjecture regarding
the incumbent's type is for its entry decision. If rm 1 chooses a location x
1
2
h
_x
1
(1; f);
1
2
i
then
there exists a critical level of the posterior  that we will denote _ (x
1
; f), such that rm 2 does
not enter if  > _ (x
1
; f), is indierent between entering or not if  = _ (x
1
; f), and enters if
 < _ (x
1
; f). Finally, for any location x
1
< _x
1
(1; f), rm 2 always enters the market whatever
its posterior belief . Thus, for values of f in the range

f(c); f
i
, entry would be thwarted if
x
Dening A (x
1
; ; t) =
1
36

 20x
2
1
+ 8 (2 + 
t
+ 3
t
) x
1
+ (2 + 
t
)
2
+ (12 + 6+ 9
t
) 
t

and B (x
1
; t) = r  
1
2
 
 
x
2
1
  x
1

, we obtain more explicitly:
^

1
(x
1
; ; t)
(
= A (x
1
; ; t) if x
1
< _x
1
(; f)
2 fA (x
1
; ; t) ; B (x
1
; t)g if x
1
= _x
1
(; f)
= B (x
1
; t) otherwise
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and only if rst, the observed location of rm 1 is close enough to the market center and second,
the entrant expects with relatively high posterior probability that the incumbent is of the low
cost type.
3.2 The limit probability function
The limit probability function and the intervals dened in this sub-section provide an easier
description of the whole set of separating and pooling location equilibria. Since for out-of-
equilibrium locations posterior beliefs are indeterminate, the limit probability function will help
to characterize the range of posterior belief  which would sustain a given equilibrium. Under
the assumption f < f , there exists a critical level of the posterior belief , strictly positive and
denoted by 
f
, such that rm 2, observing x
1
=
1
2
, does not enter if  > 
f
, enters if  < 
f
and is indierent if  = 
f
. For any   
f
we dene
_
X
1
(; f) as the interval
h
_x
1
(; f);
1
2
i
of
rm 1's locations which thwart entry given the posterior belief .
For any x
1
2
_
X (; f) we dene _ (x
1
; f) as the smallest value of  for which rm 2 does
not enter if rm 1 is located at x
1
. Note that if  > _ (x
1
; f), entry is strictly thwarted whereas
if  = _ (x
1
; f), entry is weakly thwarted since rm 2 is indierent between entering and not.
Given f , the function _
1
(x
1
; f) is decreasing in x
1
, from 1 at x
1
= _x
1
(1; f) to 
f
at x
1
=
1
2
.
Also for a given x
1
, the function _ (x
1
; f) is decreasing with f . Let us dene:
 X
W
1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; t) as the set of locations which, whatever the posterior belief  of rm 2, would
be worse for rm 1 than x
0
1
with posterior 
0
.
 X
M
1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; t) as the set of locations which result, for some posterior , in the same prot
for rm 1 as (x
0
1
; 
0
), such that rm 2 is not indierent between entering and not.
For any location x
0
1
and posterior belief 
0
such that the market is attractive enough to the
potential entrant,
{
and for any location x
1
, let us dene the limit posterior probability function
denoted by ~ (x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; t) as follows: if the posterior belief  of rm 2 observing x
1
is higher
than ~(), then it leads rm 1 of type t to switch from x
0
1
to x
1
, that is  > ~ (x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; t) )
^

1
(x
1
; ; t) >
^

1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; t). We obtain:
 for x
1
2 X
M
1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; t), ~ (x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; t) is the unique solution of
^

1
(x
1
; ; t) =
^

1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; t)
since the
^

1
(x
1
; ; t) are parabolic functions;
{
Formally 
0

< _ (x
0
1
; f) ; if x
0
1
2
_
X
1
(1; f)
2 [0; 1] ; otherwise.
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 for x
1
2 X
W
1
(x
0
1
; 
0
; t), ~ (x
1
; x
0
1
; 
0
; t) = 1 since no conjecture based upon the location x
1
makes the deviation attractive;
 for any other x
1
, ~ (x
1
; x
0
1
; t) = _ (x
1
; f) since any such x
1
allows the incumbent to prevent
entry for values of the posterior belief in the interval [ _ (x
1
; f) ; 1].
4 EQUILIBRIA
We rst describe the set of separating equilibria and then the set of pooling equilibria. In
a separating equilibrium, observing x
1
allows the value of t to be inferred exactly while the
observation of x
1
in a pooling equilibrium gives no information. One could expect the same
result as in Milgrom-Roberts' limit pricing analysis: \in any separating equilibrium entry takes
place in exactly the same circumstances as if the entrant had been informed about the value of
the incumbent's cost"(p. 448). However, in the present context, entry does not take place in a
separating equilibrium in exactly the same circumstances as under full information. For values
of f 2

f(c); f
i
, entry is blockaded by the low cost incumbent under full information while
entry is accommodated by both types in any separating location equilibrium under incomplete
information. Thus the low cost incumbent nds it more protable to let the competitor whereas
under complete information she would drive him out of the market. Such a striking result is
obtained when rm 2, observing the incumbent choose to locate at the market center, does not
put too much weight on rm 1 being the low cost type. If this were not so, the low cost incumbent
would not nd it attractive to reveal her type. Furthermore, the low cost incumbent cannot
separate from her high cost counterpart at any location inside
_
X(1; f), the set of locations close
to the market center which deter entry provided that the entrant's beliefs are rather pessimistic
(that is, concentrated on the low cost type). At any location in this set with  = 1, the
high cost incumbent would nd mimicry protable since she could deter entry by being falsely
identied. Therefore the separating equilibrium locations for the low cost incumbent must be
outside
_
X
1
(1; f) and entry is thus accommodated.
In order to better understand the conditions under which there exist separating equilibria,
let us consider Figure 1 where the prot functions
^

1
(x
1
; ; t),  2 f0; 1g, are plotted on the
same diagrams for both types t of rm 1. Remember that in a separating equilibrium rm 1
discloses its type in choosing its location. Hence the equilibrium prot of the high cost type
must lie on the
^

1
(x
1
; 0; h) curve. If so, the sole equilibrium location of this high cost type is the
location maximizing
^
 (x
1
; 0; h), denoted by x
m
1
(0; h). It is clear that the separating equilibrium
location of the low cost type cannot lie in X
M
1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h)[
_
X
1
(1; f) as dened in section
3.2, since then the high cost type would mimic the low cost type. The high cost type would
be more protable if it were located in these intervals and identied as a low cost rm, than
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at x
m
1
(0; h) and rightly identied as the high cost type. Moreover, the low cost type cannot
locate outside X
M
1
(x
m
1
(0; `)0; `)[
_
X
1
(1; f), for instance in the interval [0; b] in Figure 1, since
it would then be more protable for the low cost rm 1 to deviate to x
m
1
(0; `) whatever the
posterior of rm 2 observing x
m
1
(0; `). Dening x
+
1
(x
1
; ; t) as sup
n
x
1
j x
1
2 X
M
1
(x
1
; ; t)
o
, we
thus nd that the only possible locations for the low cost rm 1 are the locations in the interval
h
x
+
1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h) ; _x
1
(1; f)

, that is, the interval [a; _x
1
(1; f)) in the case of Figure 1. This
interval is not empty for values of f lower than some
~
f .
k
Let x
h
1
and x
`
1
be some locations satisfying all of the above constraints. Such locations
can appear as separating equilibrium locations for rm 1 provided that the out-of-equilibrium
posteriors do not lead either type of rm 1 to deviate, that is, provided that rm 2, observing a
deviation, would assign a suciently high posterior probability to the high cost type. Hence the
necessary and sucient conditions such that x
h
1
and x
`
1
are separating equilibrium locations
are the following: the posterior beliefs function must satisfy conditions (4.1) and (4.2) below:
- for x
1
2
n
x
h
1
; x
`
1
o
:
^

h

x
h
1

= 1 and ^

`

x
`
1

= 1 (4. 1)
- for x
1
=2
n
x
h
1
; x
`
1
o
:
^

`
(x
1
)
8
>
<
>
:
 _ (x
1
; f) ; if x
1
2
_
X
1
(1; f)
 min
n
~

x
1
; x
h
1
; 0; h

; ~

x
1
; x
`
1
; 1; `
o
; otherwise
(4. 2)
In order for separating equilibria to exist, the following conditions on c and f must hold:

x
+
1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h)
1
2
(4. 3)
f  min
n
~
f; f
o
(4. 4)
The set

f(c);min
n
~
f; f
oi
is illustrated in Figure 2; it is non empty for c  c.
Let us examine the dierent causes of non-existence of a separating equilibrium. First, if the
xed cost is suciently high

f  f

so that _x
1
(0; f) 
1
2
, then locating at the market center
is the best strategy for both types of rm 1, regardless of rm 2's posteriors beliefs. The type
k
Straightforward calculations give
~
f =
3
25

1  2c 
 
c+
1
4
c
2

1=2

2
which is plotted on Figure 2. Note that
when f  []
~
f, we have a  [] _x
1
(1; f).

In the particular context of this paper, (4.3) can be rewritten as c  c where c =
9
p
5
  4. Moreover, it can be
shown that
~
f(c) and f(c) intersect at c = c.
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of the rm is therefore not revealed. Second, if the gap c between the variable costs of the two
types of rm 1 is too large, we have
^

1
(
1
2
; 1; h) >
^

1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h). Thus even without xed
costs no separating equilibrium exists since there is no interval of locations where the low cost
rm 1 could locate and be identied as such, without leading the high cost rm 1 to choose
the same location. For suciently large values of the gap, the reaction of rm 2 observing any
x
0
1
2

x
m
1
(0; h);
1
2

and believing that it faces a low cost rm 1, is to locate far enough from
x
0
1
such that the high cost rm 1's prot at x
0
1
is higher than at x
m
1
(0; h), when it is rightly
identied as the high cost type. Hence the self selection constraints cannot be satised (see
Boyer, Laont, Mahenc and Moreaux (1994, 1995) for details). A third cause comes from the
interaction between the eciency gap and the xed cost when the eciency gap is suciently
small. With no xed costs, separating equilibria would exist. But if the xed cost of entry is
high enough, f >
~
f , then any location that would be a separating equilibrium location for the
low cost rm 1 in the no xed cost case, that is, x
1
> a, is indeed a monopoly position when the
low cost type is rightly identied, that is x
1
> _x
1
(1; f). The separating equilibrium locations
with no xed cost are thus in
_
X
1
(1; f). Hence the high cost rm 1 would also enjoy a monopoly
position if rm 2 believed it to be the low cost type. It would therefore mimic the low cost rm
1 since it then is more protable than at x
m
1
(0; h) when rightly identied. We conclude:
Proposition 4.1 Provided that f belongs to (c);, there exists a whole continuum of separating
equilibria for suciently low values of the eciency gap (c  c) and of the xed cost f <
~
f .
Both types of incumbent accommodate entry at such equilibrium locations so that:
 the high cost incumbent chooses the same location as she would under full information.
 the low cost incumbent moves away from the market center, which is the entry blockading
equilibrium strategy under full information, namely: x
`
1
< _x
1
(1; f) <
1
2
.
One can interpret Proposition 1 as follows. Under asymmetric information, the low cost incum-
bent must incur a cost of separation due to a \non-optimal location". To be perfectly identied,
she must give up a pooling monopoly position at the market center which is also her complete
information equilibrium location. The signaling cost corresponds to the dierence between her
incomplete information separating equilibrium prot and her complete information equilibrium
prot. The low cost incumbent needs to accommodate entry in order to disclose her information
whereas entry would have been blockaded under full information. This a rather paradoxical
result: given some appropriate conjectures (namely entrants' beliefs are not concentrated on the
low cost type at locations close to the center), an incumbent may nd it protable to move away
from her entry blockading complete information location so as to let a less ecient rm (the
entrant) enter and enjoy a positive market share.
12
Let us now consider the pooling equilibria. In a pure strategy pooling equilibrium both
types of rm 1 choose the same location so that, in observing this location, rm 2 obtains no
additional information on the type of its competitor. The posteriors therefore take the same
values as the priors. Let us denote by x

1
a pooling equilibrium location. Let us remark rst
that x
1
2 union
t=h;`
X
W
1
(x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t) cannot be an equilibrium since at least one of the types
of rm 1, say t
0
, would earn higher prot at x
m
1
(0; t
0
) whatever the posteriors of rm 2 observing
x
1
. Consider a location x

1
outside union
t=h;`
X
W
1
(x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t). For this location to be a
pooling equilibrium, two conditions must be satised by 
0
`
: the high cost incumbent must nd
it protable to mimic her low cost counterpart, and the latter must not be able to separate
herself from the former:

0
`
 max
t=h;`
~ (x

1
; x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t) (4. 5)
If (4.5) were not veried, we would have for some type t
0
:
^


1
(t
0
) =
^

1

x

1
; 
0
; t
0

<
^

1
 
x
m
1
(0; t
0
); 0; t
0

and the implied type t
0
would be better at x
m
1
(0; t
0
) whatever rm 2's beliefs observing x
m
1
(0; t
0
).
Such a location is supported as a pooling equilibrium by the posterior belief function:
^

`
(x
1
)
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
 _ (x
1
; f) for x
1
2
_
X
1
(1; f)
= 
0
`
for x
1
= x

1
 min

~
 
x
1
; x

1
; 
0
`
; h

; ~
 
x
1
; x

1
; 
0
`
; `
	
otherwise
(4. 6)
There are two kinds of pooling equilibria depending on whether entry is accommodated or
prevented.
yy
Consider rst a location x

1
belonging to
_
X
1
(1; f) with 
0
`
 _ (x

1
; f). There
exists some conjecture sustaining x

1
as a pooling equilibrium. Firm 2's priors puts a suciently
high weight on the low cost type that its high cost counterpart nd it protable to mimic it.
Thus the high cost incumbent locates away from her full information entry accommodating
location to successfully thwart entry under incomplete information. The high cost incumbent
moves towards the market center
zz
such that observing x

1
provides no information. Since the
incumbent's location signals a low protability of entry in equilibrium, a potential entrant prefers
to stay out of the market. Such pooling equilibria result in less entry (the probability of entry
yy
Note that, depending on the values of the eciency gap c and the xed cost f , the set of pooling equilibrium
locations may be either connected for f suciently high, given c, as in the case of Figure 3 where the set of
pooling is the interval [b;
1
2
], or disconnected as in the case of Figure 1 where the set of pooling is given by the
union of two intervals, namely [b; a]
S
_
X(1; f).
zz
Straightforward calculations show that x
m
1
(0; h) < _x
1
(1; f) is equivalent to f <
1
3
 
3
5
  c

2
, an inequality that
is satised by any f 2
 
f(c); f

.
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is zero) than in the full information case where the probability of entry is 
0
h
, the probability or
percentage of high cost incumbents in the market.
Another kind of pooling equilibrium exists where both types of the incumbent accommodate
entry, namely any location outside union
t=h;`
X
W
1
(x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t), when the prior and posterior
beliefs satisfy (4.5) and (4.6) and 
0
`
< _ (x

1
; f) if x

1
belongs to
_
X
1
(1; f). An interpretation of
this result is that the decision of an established rm to locate close to the market center, what-
ever its type, may accommodate entry at equilibrium when the prior probability of the high cost
incumbent (an incumbent no more ecient than the entrant) is high, and correspondingly, the
prot from entering is suciently high to cover the xed cost. The high cost incumbent would
also accommodate entry in the full information case. However, in a context of asymmetric infor-
mation, she nds it protable to \quit" her full information equilibrium location to move towards
the market center. Hence the high cost incumbent mimics her low cost counterpart's accommo-
dating strategy because the entrant dierentiates more than he would if he were fully informed.
Therefore competition is relaxed in the delivered pricing competition subgame. By contrast,
the low cost incumbent would have blockaded entry in the full information case. However, in
the case of asymmetric information, the entrant's inference as to cost conditions encourages an
entry accommodating strategy and discourages any deviation to a location where the low cost
incumbent would be perfectly identied. Thus unlike the former kind of pooling equilibria, this
kind involves more entry (the probability of entry is one) than in the full information case where
it is again 
0
h
.
Proposition 4.2 Any location outside
t=h;`
X
W
1
x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t is a pure strategy pooling equilib-
rium if and only if prior beliefs satisfy requirement (4.5) and posterior beliefs satisfy requirement
(4.6). A pooling equilibrium location x

1
deters entry if 
0
`
 _x

1
; f . Otherwise, entry is accom-
modated in a pooling equilibrium.
Note that there is no pooling equilibrium if the prior probability of a low cost incumbent is small,
namely if 
0
`
< 
0
`
where 
0
`
denotes the lowest value taken by max
t=h;`
~ (x

1
; x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t) over
the candidate pooling locations x

1
. It can be shown that 
0
`
is strictly positive: from the deni-
tion of ~ (x
1
; x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t), we obtain that max
t=h;`
~ (x
1
; x
m
1
(0; t); 0; t) is a continuous function
with two local minima; one, the market center and the other, that location between x
m
1
(0; h)
and x
m
1
(0; `) at which the functions ~ (x
1
; x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h) and ~ (x
1
; x
m
1
(0; `); 0; `) intersect, their
values being strictly positive at both locations.
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5 K-UNDEFEATED EQUILIBRIA
In the present model the action space of each player is continuous so that, as in most cases, there
exists a continuum of PBE. Hence we need a renement device. The now classical criteria, such as
the intuitive criterion, theD1 criterion or the sequential perfectness criterion, do not restrict very
eciently the set of equilibria in the present context. But, as far as only pure strategy equilibria
are concerned, we may resort to a new renement in the spirit of the criterion recently proposed
by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993). Consider two PBE: E

= fx^

1
; x^

2
; ^

g and
E

= fx^

1
; x^

2
; ^

g. Equilibrium E

defeats equilibrium E

if there exists rst, an equilibrium
location x

1
in E

(that is, x

1
2 fx^

1
(t); t 2 Tg) which is not an equilibrium location in E

(that
is, x

1
=2 fx

1
(t); t 2 Tg) and second, a subset of types K  T such that:
(i) dening
^


1
(t) and
^


1
(t) as the equilibrium prots of type t in E

and E

respectively,
x^

1
(t) = x

1
8t 2 K
^


1
(t) 
^


1
(t) 8t 2 K
^


1
(t) >
^


1
(t) for some type t 2 K
(5. 1)
(ii) for some t 2 K:


t
(x

1
) 6 =

0
t
(t)
P
t
0
2T

0
t
0
(t
0
)
(5. 2)
for any function (t) : T ! [0; 1] satisfying:
n
t
0
2 K and
^


1
(t
0
) >
^


1
(t
0
)
o
) (t
0
) = 1
t
0
=2 K ) (t
0
) = 0:
An equilibrium E

is K-undefeated if no E

2 E exists that defeats it. Intuitively, (paraphras-
ing Mailath et alii (1993)), one checks for K-undefeatedness of a proposed equilibrium E

by
considering a location x

not chosen in E

but chosen in an alternative equilibrium E

by a
subset K  T of types of the rst mover, for which the second equilibrium Pareto dominates the
rst one in the sense of condition (i). K-undefeatedness requires that the second mover's updated
beliefs at that location x

in the original equilibrium be consistent with the existence of such
a subset K, in the sense of condition (ii)

for all t 2 K : ^

t
(x

1
) =
 

0
t
(t)=
P
t
0
2T

0
t
0
(t
0
)

.
If the beliefs which support the original equilibrium are not consistent in this way, then the
second equilibrium is said to defeat the proposed equilibrium. This is a modied version of un-
defeatedness as proposed by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite in that we split the set of
sender's types in two subsets: the subset K of types which prefer the alternative equilibrium to
the proposed equilibrium, and the complementary subset. The idea is that not every type that
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sends one signal does at least as well to send a second signal. Howeveer, some types distinguish
themselves in that they have an incentive to send a second signal. Thus we require that only
these types actually send a second signal.
According to the values of the cost discrepancies and the priors there may exist either
only separating equilibria, only pooling equilibria, or both. We examine these three cases in
succession.
5.1 Only separating equilibria exist
Pooling may not occur if the prior probability of low cost is too small { so small that high cost
incumbents nd it unprotable to masquerade as low cost ones { namely if 
0
`
< 
0
`
. In this
case, only the Riley equilibrium, that is, the separating equilibrium with the least amount of
inecient signaling, is K-undefeated. Consider two separating equilibria
n
x
m
1
(0; h); x
`
1
o
and
n
x
m
1
(0; h); x

0
`
1
o
with x

0
`
1
< x
`
1
; let us show that x

0
`
1
defeats x
`
1
. Since
^

1

x

0
`
1
; 1; `

>
^


1

x
`
1
; 1; `

(see Figure 1), then K = f`g. The equilibrium
n
x
m
1
(0; h); x
`
1
o
is sustained by
posteriors ^

`

x

0
`
1

 min
n
~

x

0
`
1
; x
`
1
; 1; `

; ~

x

0
`
1
; x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h
o
< 1. Since (`) = 1 and
(h) = 0, then


0
`
(`)=
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

= 1 6 =^

`

x

0
`
1

, that is, (5.2) is satised. Thus the
only separating equilibrium which cannot be defeated is the Riley equilibrium, that is, the least
distorting separating equilibrium. We will denote by x
`;R
1
the Riley equilibrium location of
the low cost type rm 1: x
`;R
1
= inf
n
x
`
1
j
n
x
m
1
(0; h); x
`
1
(0; h); x
`
1
o
2 S
o
where S is the set of
separating equilibria.
5.2 Only pooling equilibria exist
According to the value of the prior 
0
`
, the market center may or may not be a pooling equilibrium
where entry by rm 2 is blockaded. Suppose rst that 
0
`
 
f
so that x
1
=
1
2
is a pooling
equilibrium where rm 2 does not enter (recall that 
f
= _

1
2
; f

, see section 3.2 above). Let us
show that it is the only K-undefeated equilibrium. Let x

1
<
1
2
be another pooling equilibrium.
For each type t 2 T;
^

1

1
2
; 
0
`
; t

>
^

1
 
x

1
; 
0
`
; t

so that K = T . The equilibrium location
x

1
is sustained by posteriors satisfying ^

`

1
2

 
f
, hence ^

`

1
2

 
0
`
. Since both types of
rm 1 earn higher prots at
1
2
than at x

1
, then K = fh; `g, and (t) = 1 8t 2 T , such that
Mailath et alii (1993) set forth that the subset K includes all the types t such that x^

1
(t) = x

1
. But taking
K as the maximum set of types sending x

1
severely restricts the renement power of the criterion as far as
pooling equilibria are concerned. The marginal change we bring to the concept of undefeated equilibrium appears
also in a renement concept proposed by Umbhauer (1991), the consistent forward equilibrium renement. Both
the criterion of Mailath et alii and that of Umbhauer interpret disequilibrium messages as signals and remove
implausible equilibria by using the logic of forward induction.
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
0
t
(t)=
P
t
0
2T

0
t
0
(t
0
)

= 
0
t
. Hence rst, if 
0
`
> 
f
, then (5.2) is satised and second, if

0
`
= 
f
, then (5.2) is satised provided that the posteriors sustaining x

1
; ^

`

1
2

are strictly less
than 
0
`
.
Suppose now that 
0
`
< 
f
, so that, for any location x
1
, if ^
`
(x
1
) = 
0
`
then rm 2 enters the
market. In this case the two functions
^

1
 
x
1
; 
0
`
; t

; t 2 T , are strictly concave and maximized
at dierent locations x
m
1
 

0
`
; t

; t 2 T . Let us dene x
p
1
 

0
`
; t

as follows:
x
p
1


0
`
; t

2
n
^

1

x
1
; 
0
; t

j x
1
satises (5.4) and (5.5)
o
(5. 3)
x
1
2
1
2
nunion
t=h;`
X
1
 
x
m
1
(0; t
0
); 0; t
0

(5. 4)
~
 
x
1
; x
m
1
(0; t
0
); 0; t
0

 
0
`
t
0
2 T (5. 5)
The location x
p
1
 

0
`
; t

is the pooling location which maximizes type t's prot amongst all the
locations which may appear as pooling locations given the prior 
0
`
. For all the admissible values
of the variable cost discrepancy c, we have x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

 x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

.
First, consider the pooling locations x

1
such that either x

1
< x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

or x

1
> x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

.
For any such location there exists another pooling, which we will denote by x

0
1
, for which
^

1

x

0
1
; 
0
`
; t

>
^

1
 
x

1
; 
0
`
; t

; t 2 T : if x

1
< x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

then choose an x

0
1
2
 
x

1
; x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

and
if x

1
> x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

then choose an x

0
1
2
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; x

1

. In this case K = T and the equilibrium
x

1
is sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs ^

`

x

0
1

 min
n
~

x

0
1
; x

1
; 
0
`
; t

; t 2 T
o
< 
0
`
, the
second inequality being implied by
^

1

x

0
1
; 
0
`
; t

>
^

1
 
x

1
; 
0
`
; t

; t 2 T . Since both rms are
more protable at x

0
1
, then (t) = 1; t 2 T , so that


0
t
(t)=
P
t
0
2T

0
t
0
(t
0
)

= 
0
`
6 =^

t

x

0
1

,
that is, (5.2) is satised. We conclude that any pooling x

1
such that either x

1
< x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

or
x

1
> x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

is defeated.
Second, consider the pooling equilibrium locations x

1
2

x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

; x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

and take any
other pooling x

0
1
2
 
x

1
; x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

. For such a location we have
^

1

x

0
1
; 
0
`
; `

>
^

1
 
x

1
; 
0
`
; `

and
^

1

x

0
1
; 
0
`
; h

<
^

1
 
x

1
; 
0
`
; h

so that K = f`g. For x

1
to be an equilibrium it must be
sustained by posteriors ^

`
(x

1
) < 
0
`
. The function  is in the present case: (`) = 1 and
(h) = 0, hence


0
`
(`)=
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

= 1 > ^

`

x

0
`

and (5.2) is satised. We conclude that
all the pooling under consideration are defeated.
Third, consider the pooling location x

1
= x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

. The only other pooling locations which
could possibly defeat x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

are pooling locations x

0
1
in the interval

x
 
1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; `

,
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

, where for any x
1
;  and t; x
 
1
(x
1
; ; t) is dened as inf fx
0
1
j x
0
1
2 X
1
(x
1
; ; t)g. In
such pooling locations x

0
1
the high cost type is more protable than at x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

, and the low
Were K be dened as f`; hg, as in Mailath et alii (1993), we could not eliminate those locations.
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cost type, less protable. Since

x
p
1
 

0
`
; h

; x
p
1
 

0
`
; `



x
 
1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; h

; x
p
1
 

0
`
; `


, such
pooling locations x

0
1
exist. The equilibrium x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

is sustained by any out-of-equilibrium
beliefs ^

`

x

0
1

 min
n
~

x

0
1
; x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; t

; t 2 T
o
, one of which is ^

`

x

0
1

= 0, that is,
^

h

x

0
1

= 1. However, there exists a whole range of posteriors each of which works as well,
namely ^

h

x

0
1

2

max
n
~

x

0
1
; x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; t

; t 2 T
o
; 1

. The set K is equal to fhg and
the functions  takes the following values: (h) = 1 and (`) = 0, so that


0
h
(h)=
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

= 1. We conclude that x

1
= x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

is K-undefeated i sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs
^

h

x

0
1

= 1 for any x

0
1
which satises (5.4), (5.5) with a strict inequality rather than a weak
one, and x

0
1
< x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

.
5.3 Both separating and pooling equilibria exist
If 
0
`
 
f
, then x
1
=
1
2
is a pooling equilibrium location which results for each type of rm 1
in higher prots than any other equilibrium location, either pooling or separating. The analysis
is quite similar to the analysis conducted in the above subsection 5.2 (rst paragraph) since
the posteriors sustaining any equilibrium other than
1
2
must satisfy ^

`

1
2

 
f
. Hence the
conclusion is the same:
1
2
is the only K-undefeated equilibrium if either 
0
`
> 
f
, or 
0
`
= 
f
and the posteriors sustaining any other equilibrium are such that ^

`

1
2

< 
0
`
.
Suppose now that 
0
`
< 
f
so that rm 2 enters the market in both pooling and separating
equilibria. All the defeating relations between separating equilibria are the same as those we
examined in subsection 5.1. Hence it only remains to compare the Riley equilibrium to the
pooling equilibrium x

1
= x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

supported by posteriors ^

h
(x
0
1
) = 1 for any location x
0
1
< x

1
which may appear as a pooling equilibrium location.
First, suppose that
^

1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; `

<
^

1

x
`;R
1
; 1; `

. Let us rst show that the Riley
equilibrium defeats the pooling. The pooling is sustained by posteriors ^

`

x
`;R
1

< 1. Since
K = f`g, then  (`) = 1 and (h) = 0 so that


0
`
 (`) =
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

= 1, that is, (5.2)
is satised. The same argument shows that no pooling can defeat the Riley equilibrium (the
low cost type would lose if it sent a pooling signal). We conclude that in this case the Riley
equilibrium is the only K-undefeated equilibrium.
Second, suppose that
^

1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; `

>
^

1

x
`;R
1
; 1; `

and let us show that the pooling
defeats the Riley equilibrium. Note that by assumption 
0
`
> ~

x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; x
`;R
1
; 1; `), and
the Riley equilibrium is sustained by posteriors ^

`
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

 ~

x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; x
`;R
1
; 1; `

. Also
^

1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; `


^

1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h) since x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

is a pooling equilibrium, thus K =
fh; `g. First, if the high cost type earns strictly higher prots in the pooling equilibrium, then
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(h) = 1 =  (`); therefore


0
`
(`)=
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

= 
0
`
> 

`
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

implying that (5.2) is
satised and the Riley equilibrium is defeated.
Third, suppose that
^

1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; `

=
^

1

x
`;R
1
; 1; `

. Let us show that the two equi-
libria remain K-undefeated. The only type that could be induced to deviate from equilibrium is
the high cost type which would prefer the pooling i
^

1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; h

>
^

1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h),
which is necessarily satised. In this case, K = fh; `g. The Riley equilibrium is sustained by
posteriors ^

`
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

 ~
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h

< 
0
`
, that is, ^

h
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

> 
0
h
. In
the present case, (h) = 1 and (`) 2 [0; 1], therefore we have


0
h
(h)=
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

2


0
h
; 1

.
Thus there exists some value of  (`) such that


0
h
(h)=
P
t2T

0
t
(t)

= ^

h
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

. Since the
same argument applies to the other type `, then (5.2) is not satised. Clearly each equilibrium
remains K-undefeated by the other one when
^

1
 
x
p
1
 

0
`
; `

; 
0
`
; h

=
^

1
(x
m
1
(0; h); 0; h). Lastly,
the pooling cannot be defeated by another separating equilibrium nor the Riley equilibrium
defeated by another pooling.
We recapitulate as follows:
Proposition 5.1 When f belongs to (c); and c belongs to 0;
1
2
, the complete information equi-
librium calls for the low cost incumbent to blockade entry by locating at the market center and
for the high cost incumbent to accomodate entry; however, under incomplete information:
 if f <
~
f and c  c:
{ for any 
0
`
2 
f
; 1, both pooling and separating equilibria exist and the unique K-
undefeated equilibrium calls for both types of incumbent to pool at the market center
and for the entrant to stay out. Thus entry is blockaded by the high cost incumbent;
{ for any 
0
`
2 
0
`
; 
f
, both pooling and separating equilibria exist and the unique K-
undefeated equilibrium is such that either both types of incumbent accommodate entry
with x
h
1
= x
m
1
(0; h) and x
`
1
= x
`;R
1
, or both types deter entry with x
h
1
= x
`
1
=
x
p
1

0
`
; `, depending on which of the two equilibrium outcomes results in more prot for
the low cost incumbent;
{ for any 
0
`
2 0; 
0
`
, only separating equilibria exist and the unique K-undefeated equi-
librium is such that both types of incumbent accommodate entry with x
h
1
= x
m
1
(0; h)
and x
`
1
= x
`;R
1
.
 Otherwise, only pooling equilibria exist and
{ for any 
0
`
2 
f
; 1, the unique K-undefeated equilibrium calls for both types of incum-
bent to pool at the market center. Entry is blockaded.
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{ for any 
0
`
2 0; 
f
, the unique K-undefeated equilibrium calls for both types of incum-
bent to pool at x
p
1

0
`
; ` sustained by posterior beliefs concentrated on the high cost type
for any other location to the left of x
p
1

0
`
; `. Entry is accommodated.
When prior beliefs are such that 
0
`
is suciently high (that is, the entrant expects a priori
that the incumbent is a low cost one), the market center emerges not only as an entry blockading
strategy for the high cost incumbent but also as the unique K-undefeated equilibrium. Thus
the entrant prefers staying out even if the incumbent is no more ecient. As there is less entry
than under full information, the entry blockading behavior is damaging for social welfare and
might be discouraged by public policy.
More disturbing is the case in which prior beliefs are such that 
0
`
is rather small. For values
of the xed cost no higher than
~
f , and values of the variable cost lower than c, the least cost
separating equilibrium is the only plausible equilibrium. Thus the low cost incumbent nds it
protable to accommodate entry when a potential entrant is not a priori perfectly informed
about her eciency. Recall that this type of incumbent would actually blockade entry at the
market center were information complete. Not only is the potential entrant uncertain about the
eciency of the established rm but he also believes, for some exogenous reason, with such low
probability that a low cost incumbent is likely to be observed at the market center that, if such
an observation was made, he will enter the market and compete. This conjecture gives the low
cost incumbent a strong incentive to disclose information. Thus entry is accommodated.
For other values of xed and variable costs, low values of 
0
`
also lead the low cost incumbent
to give up her full information equilibrium location at the market center and accommodate
entry. The entrant however does not learn the true cost of his competitor. The characteristics
of the technology, that is, the values of xed and variable costs, are such that no separating
equilibrium exists. Hence the incumbent cannot disclose information on her true cost whatever
her type. Nevertheless, the low cost incumbent nds it protable to give up her full information
equilibrium location at the market center and share the market, since the entrant puts sucient
weight on the probability of the incumbent being the high cost type. Thus entry will not be
thwarted if this location is observed. Although the threat of entry is based on the overestimation
of the ecient incumbent's cost, there is nothing an incumbent can do to correct the entrant's
conjecture. Thus locating away from the market center allows the low cost incumbent to relax
price competition by increasing product dierentiation.
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6 CONCLUSION
In reaction to Schmalensee (1978), some economic theorists have argued that there may be
better entry preventing strategies than product proliferation. Either product specication is
more protable in some cases (Bonanno 1987), or the incumbent may not incur suciently high
exit costs to credibly deter entry by crowding the product spectrum (Judd (1985)). However,
little attention has been paid to entry blockading behavior in spatial or product dierentiation
competition. We have stressed the importance of such behavior in the context of incomplete
information. If the potential entrant is not perfectly informed about the incumbent's costs,
pre-entry product specication may rationally be read as a signal regarding these costs. Hence,
beliefs are of great relevance in the emergence of entry blockading strategies. We have considered
a market that under full information would be monopolized by a low cost incumbent who
blockades entry by locating at the market center, but would not be monopolized by a high
cost incumbent. Under incomplete information, if a priori the potential entrant expects the
incumbent to be of the low cost type, the market center becomes a plausible location from
which a high cost incumbent blockades entry. On the other hand, if a priori the entrant expects
the incumbent to be a high cost type with a high probability, entry will occur regardless of
the incumbent's cost. The low cost incumbent then nd it more protable to abandon her full
information location at the market center, thus accommodating entry. She moves away from
the market center so as to either nd a location where she can credibly disclose information
on her true costs, or if mimicry from a high cost incumbent cannot be prevented, relax price
competition through more product dierentiation.
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APPENDIX
Given the equilibrium price schedule (2.1), the subgame (full information) equilibrium prots
are given by the following expressions, where 
h
= c and 
`
= 0, if both rms are present in the
market, that is, for any x
1
2
h
0;
1
2
i
and x
2
2 (x
1
; 1],

1
(x
1
; x
2
; t) =

1
2
x
2

2
  3

1
2
x
1

2
+
1
2
x
1
x
2
+
1
2

t
(x
1
+ x
2
) +

1
2

t

2

2
(x
1
; x
2
; t) =

1
2
x
1

2
  3

1
2
x
2

2
+
1
2
x
1
x
2
+ (x
2
  x
1
) +
1
2

t
(x
1
+ x
2
)  
t
+

1
2

t

2
  f;
and if rm 2 stays out, that is, for any x
1
2
h
0;
1
2
i
and x
2
= NE,

1
(x
1
; NE; t) = r  
1
2
  (c  
t
) 
 
x
2
1
  x
1


2
(x
1
; NE; t) = 0:
If rm 2 enters the market, its location will be given by its best reply function:
x
2
=
1
3
(x
1
+ 2+ 
t
) for any x
1
2

0;
1
2

so that its prot will amount to:

2
=
1
3
(x
1
  1 + 
t
)
2
  f:
We conclude from the last formula the following. For f <
1
3

1
2
  
t

2
, whatever the location
it chooses, rm 1 cannot blockade rm 2's entry. Let us denote f(c) =
1
3

1
2
  c

2
and f =
1
12
.
In this case, the optimal decision of rm 1 of type t is to locate at x
1
(t) = min
n
1
5
(4
t
+ 2) ;
1
2
o
for t = h; `, so that the equilibrium locations and prots are given as functions of f and t as
follows :
(i) If f <
1
3

1
2
  
t

2
and 
t
<
1
8
, then
x

1
(t) =
1
5
(2 + 4
t
) ; 

1
(t) =
1
5
(1 + 2
t
)
2
x

2
(t) =
1
5
(4 + 3
t
) ; 

2
(t) =
3
25
+

3
5

2
 
2
t
+ 3
2
t

  f
(ii) If f <
1
3

1
2
  
t

2
and 
t
2
h
1
8
;
1
2

, then
x

1
(t) =
1
2
; 

1
(t) =
7
36
+
4
9
 

2
t
+ 2
t

x

2
(t) =
1
6
(5 + 2
t
) ; 

2
(t) =
1
12
+
1
3
 

t
+ 
2
t

  f
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For f 2

1
3

1
2
  
t

2
;
1
3
(1  
t
)
2

, rm 1 could either share the market by choosing x
1
2
h
0; 1  
t
  (3f)
1=2

(respectively x
1
2
h
0; 1  
t
  (3f)
1=2
i
), or blockade entry by locating at
x
1
2
h
1  
t
  (3f)
1=2
;
1
2
i
(respectively x
1
2

1  
t
  (3f)
1=2
;
1
2
i
if rm 2 chooses not to enter
when indierent (respectively chooses to enter when indierent). Obviously, it is better for
rm 1 to blockade entry and locate at x
1
=
1
2
where the monopoly prot is maximized. For
f >
1
3
(1  
t
)
2
, rm 2 never enters regardless of the location of rm 1. Therefore:
(iii) If f =
1
3

1
2
  
t

2
, there are two equilibria: the rst one the same as in the previous case
(i), the second one given by
x

1
(t) =
1
2
; 

1
(t) = r  
1
4
  (c  
t
)
x

2
(t) = NE; 

2
(t) = 0
(iv) If f >
1
3

1
2
  
t

2
, there is only one equilibrium where rm 1 blockades entry at the
market center.
Note that when the xed cost of the second mover is high enough but not too high, that is
f 2

1
3

1
2
  
t

2
;
1
3
(1  
t
)
2

, there exists a whole range of entry blockading locations in the
neighborhood of the market center. This range, equal to
h
1  
t
  (3f)
1=2
;
1
2
i
, is an increasing
function of the variable cost gap between the two rms, and of the entrant's xed cost. For such
values of the xed cost, the incumbent's location is not driven by product dierentiation purposes
as is usually the case in spatial competition models. The classic conict in the determination
of the equilibrium dierentiation, a greater market share versus more drastic price competition
when locating nearer the market center, disappears (see Anderson (1987) for an analysis of
Stackelberg spatial competition conducted in terms of mill prices rather than of delivered prices
as in the present paper). The only remaining strategic eects are rst, the incentive to drive
the rival out of the market and second, the maximization of the monopoly prot. Both eects
work in the same direction, that is, towards the market center.
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